

Populist Discourse in the Polish Media

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6. Journalist Populist Discourse: Journalists as the Originators of Populist Messages

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Introduction

Research on populism usually focuses on political actors, i.e. politicians and parties. Yet the increasing popularity of populism worldwide cannot really be understood without an in-depth analysis of the development and the current functioning of mass media. Some papers do mention the role and influence of mass media on the progress of populism, but there is little empirical research offering a comprehensive view of this phenomenon.

Analyses of relationships between populism and the media usually concentrate on how populist actors try to influence or manipulate the media to gain publicity. Media are perceived as highly susceptible to populist manipulation due to their insatiable appetite for “the salacious and entertaining headlines and soundbites that populist actors provide” (Moffitt, 2016, p. 70). This is exacerbated by the ongoing commodification of media, and professionalization of political communication, including the accommodation of politicians to media logic. Even if a populist message is not presented in a flattering way, the very fact of its coverage is essential for publicity and legitimization in the public space. This, in turn, leads to increased recognition and better poll results.

Regardless of how we define populism (ideology or communication style; broadly or narrowly) and how media present populist ideas, the presence of populism in political discourse in the media can be perceived by the public as a sign of social approval and hence as an acceptance of the expression of such views. The spiral of silence, where one is afraid to express controversial views, may reverse, leading to the overexposure of populists in the media in relation to their real political power, and in this way, help them obtain better results in polls and during elections.

Coverage of populists in the media has been the subject of a growing number of analyses of press, TV and Internet content. However, there are still but a few studies on how journalists and media figures contribute to increased populist communication (Wettstein et al., 2018). Accordingly, we trust that our preliminary and fragmentary analysis could serve as a point of departure for the discussion on the increasing significance of journalists in disseminating populist political discourse.

Theoretical Framework

In this paper we define populism to be “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the (...) general will of the people” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). However, this definition focuses on an ideological perspective, and may be used in research on those political actors and those journalists who are openly partisan, support certain politicians, and have a strictly political function in the fight for power.

Another research perspective is based on the discursive concept of populism (Moffitt, 2016, pp. 71–72; Aslanidis, 2018, pp. 1243–1244), which dominates in research on the effect of media exposure of populists on the perception of voters and their electoral choices. Here, usually, research focuses on how populism is presented by media/journalists, and not the original content created by journalists. Analyses concern the ways that those politicians can ‘read’ the influence of media logic, or can attempt to influence journalists.

Referring to recent research on journalism and populism, M. Wettstein et al. (2018, p. 478) proposed the following model of the role of journalists in relation to populism: “Journalists can act as (1) *gatekeepers* for populist political actors and their messages, (2) as *interpreters* of populist actors in evaluating their behaviors, and (3) as *originators* of populist messages,” defining the *originator*’s role as an active involvement in populist coverage of political life, regardless of any actual connection with the populist actors (see chapter 3).

In a democracy, journalists are perceived as being representatives of their readers/audience; as the counterbalance to politicians, representing and explaining the world, but also being able to directly shape social reality. The independence of journalists from politicians is vital for their credibility, which is why this is often emphasized by the journalists themselves. Therefore, although not necessarily sympathizing with ‘the people’, journalists place themselves on the side of ‘the people’, somewhat in agreement with the binary populist worldview of ‘the good people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’.

In this chapter we focus on the roles of the journalist in populist political communication. In contrast to previous analyses in this area, we do not examine how the media report the activities of populist political actors. Rather, we were interested in the activity of journalists as interpreters of populist actors and – first and foremost – as the initiators of populist content. We analyze TV political discussion programs involving the active participation of journalists, assuming that this format is the most convenient form of manifesting their agency in political discourse.

In this paper, we analyze those political discussion programs which deal with current events and present distinctive opinions; they are often polemical, highly partisan and even provocative (Encyklopedia PWN, 2019). Although their ultimate political message is somewhat mitigated by the viewers’ expectation of objective reporting on political events, the resultant ongoing commercialization results in their growing partisanship.

In the context of the mediatization of politics, media logic can be defined as “the dominance in societal processes of the value of the news and the storytelling techniques the media make use of to take advantage of their own medium and its format”

and is a tool for gaining competitive advantage in “the ongoing struggle to capture people’s attention” (Strömbäck, 2008, p. 233). The storytelling techniques used to capture people’s attention include simplification, polarization, intensification, personalization, visualization, stereotyping, and framing politics as a strategic ‘horse race’ (ibidem). These characteristics of narration are present in the populist style presented by political actors and media, both in information or political discussion programs. However, opinion programs give the chance to take a closer look at the original activity of the journalists. In this format, it is difficult for them to hide behind editorial policy or the general line of their broadcaster: they are supposed to present their own original views.

Methodology

In this research we used a qualitative analysis of political discourse. Following M. Czyżewski et al. (1997, pp. 10–18), we define this as the discourse of political elites present in the media, including journalists, media figures, writers, scientists, officials, intellectuals, experts, businesspeople, and politicians. All these groups have a direct degree of control over the knowledge available publicly, publicly legitimized opinions, and the shape and content of the public discourse. Political discourse is, therefore, the discourse of symbolic elites regarding political issues strictly associated with mass media, and plays a special role in shaping the hierarchy of the moral and esthetic values of the public.

This study focuses on two formats of TV political discussion programs; interviews and discussions, due their specificity and the role and significance in populist political communication. First of all, both these TV formats are based on interactions between the show participants. A TV interview is an interaction between an interviewer and interviewee, and a discussion on current political affairs is an interaction moderated by a host, who intervenes concerning the formal questions: the subject of the discussion, and maintaining the voice of each of the participants in the discussion.

Secondly, these formats give a large freedom to express subjective opinions, both in the questions/opening discussion and the reactions resulting from direct interactions. In this way they are a combination of the political discourse and the discourse on politics.¹ Finally, both formats are significant for political communication: an interview is one of the most popular forms of political journalism (Volmeer and Brants, 2011; Hoffman, 2013; Hordecki and Piontek, 2014), and the cyclical conversations of journalists on current political issues give them the chance to play the role of gatekeepers and interpreters of the political reality.

In this chapter, the study material included only statements by journalists from the leading information channels (political discourse has therefore been limited to jour-

¹ Discourse of politics refers to statements by politicians uttered in the roles assigned to them within political institutions, and to statements by political elites related to their political roles and functions. Part of the discourse of politics is reported in the media, which influences the communication behaviors of politicians and creates a double audience: direct audience (i.e. consisting of other politicians) and mass audience (Czyżewski et al., 1997). The existence of that other audience may strongly affect politicians (Piontek, 2011). Discourse of politics dominates in the information programs, while political discourse prevails in political discussion programs.

nalist elites), omitting the opinions of invited guests. The research was intended to be diagnostic in character: its aim was to determine whether the studied statements by the journalists contained indicators of the populist discourse.

There was no research hypothesis, only the following questions: (1) Did the journalists use expressions characteristic of the populist style? (2) Was the populist statement by the journalist a reaction to something or could it be defined as initiating a populist message? (3) Did the journalist define populism? If so, how? (as a threat to democracy, reinforcement of democracy, the expression of anger, communication style, electoral strategy, or as something else?) (4) Did the journalists' statements indicate the causes of increased popularity of populists? (5) Was somebody/something directly defined as populist? (6) Were media indicated as populist actors?

In line with the project that this research was part of,² we created a constructed sample, which included two types of live TV programs presented by two TV stations, one public and one private in years 2015–2017. The first type were interviews with politicians (*Tomasz Lis na żywo* on the public TVP2, and *Kropka nad i* on the private TVN24), and the second type were programs where journalists commented upon current political events (*Salon dziennikarski* on the public TVP Info, and *Loża prasowa* on the private TVN24). A list of the studied programs is shown in Table 6.6., included in the Appendix.

Differences in the number of programs broadcast on these TV channels resulted from external factors, independent of the researchers, such as institutional factors (the frequency of broadcast, editorial policy, the duration of contracts with external TV production companies) and technical limitations of the CAST software at the initial time of its operation at the Faculty of the Political Sciences and Journalism at the Adam Mickiewicz University, where the research was conducted (see chapter 1). However, in our opinion these limitations did not effectively undermine our study, given its aim and qualitative character.

Findings

Indicators of the Populist Discourse in the Journalists' Statements

The in political discourse may be characterized by reference to 'the people', both in the sense of addressing 'the people' and situating 'the people' as the main subject of politics (sovereign – the people, and its will as the most important law in democracy); speaking on behalf of 'the people'; identifying with 'the people' and representing its interests; linguistic simplification, aiming at the possibly highest accessibility of the statement; exposing conflict as the basis of the political process (between 'the people' and 'the elite', and within both the political classes) (Jagers and Walgrave, 2005; Wrześniewska-Pietrzak and Kołodziejczak, 2017).

In the selected political discussion programs with politicians or experts, journalists often asked loaded questions, arguing with the guests and presenting their own

² Premises and objectives of the project are presented in detail in chapter 1.

opinions. Some of the questions contained indicators of the populist discourse, especially anti-elitist populism, such as blaming ‘the elite’ and discrediting ‘the elite’. For example, journalists’ questions and statements concerned politicians inappropriately spending tax payers’ money, the lack of programs solving the problems of some social groups (benefits for entrepreneurs, no acceptance for the anti-violence convention, no proposals for *frankowicze* – the large groups of Polish people who took credits in Swiss francs and then faced the high increase in the franc’s value),³ or regarding the actions of politicians and other institutions playing a significant role in Polish politics, such as Catholic Church, against citizens and their will:

“Why is the Church intent on forcing women who have been raped to have those children?” (Monika Olejnik, *Kropka nad i*, May 26, 2015).

In the studied programs, the participants are supposed to comment on current events, and these were the subjects of their statements. The common practice of the hosts was to emphasize the conflict between the politicians as the main indicator and goal of politics, although the programs also included elements of the conflict between journalists and politicians. Journalists positioned themselves against ‘the elite’, which can be seen as part of the populist anti-elitism. The bias of the journalists was specially visible when criticizing certain politicians and their organizations.

A similar situation took place in TV programs moderated by journalists, involving guest journalists from different media organizations. Their attitude towards the political class was mainly critical. In *Salon dziennikarski* in 2016–2017 the criticism was directed towards the opposition (that is Platforma Obywatelska [Civic Platform, hereafter PO), while in *Loża prasowa* towards both the main ruling party at that period (that is Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – Law and Justice, hereafter PiS) and opposition parties (mainly PO), which was due to the differences in the selection of guests. The pro-government (mainly pro-PiS) *Salon dziennikarski* hosted journalists representing right-wing circles sympathetic towards the ruling party. *Loża prasowa* tried to maintain balance between journalists supporting the opposition and the ruling party, representing left-wing, centrist and right-wing attitudes (see Table 6.1 in Annex). The subjects of discussion proposed by the moderator M. Łaszcz, however, usually indirectly favored critique of the current administration and legislature (dominated by PiS), as well the President Andrzej Duda (PiS).

Initiating⁴ vs. Reactive Character of the Populist Statements made by Journalists

In the statements of the journalists conducting interviews with guests, only one program did not show any behaviour initiating a populist tone of debate. Journalists usually took a confrontational stance and asked questions which suggested answers, or

³ *Frankowicze* is the common term for the group of Polish borrowers who in 2004–2008 took out mortgage loans in Swiss francs. In 2009, the CHF exchange rate increased rapidly, which significantly worsened the situation of the borrowers. This issue became one of the most important issues of the 2015 election campaign (presidential and parliamentary).

⁴ Initiating statements open a new thread in a conversation or include a new proposal for interpretation/evaluation/explanation of the matter under discussion.

contained suppositions (“Wouldn’t you agree that ...,” “Won’t it mean that ...,” “How does your party deal with this mess?”), a good example of which is a question asked by Monika Olejnik in a program on September 5, 2016:

“Do you think, professor, that Jarosław Kaczyński has designed the state for us? Does he know what he wants to change in the consciousness of the Poles? Because it looks like he does. Looking at the beginning of the school year, for example – small children recited poems about the Second World War, the Prime Minister spoke to small children about the demographic decline, about 500+...”

The journalists demonstrated anti-elitist attitudes, visible in their negative or almost derogatory assessments of politicians:

“Isn’t it that for two, three, four months, president B. Komorowski was all the time lambasted with the critique (involving the following subjects): ‘chair (referring to his infamous blunder during his visit in Japan), shogun (referring to another infamous blunder during a visit in Japan), hunting (referring to the President’s unpopular hobby), he’s embarrassing, old and out of touch; shortly – we need young people’ and that was not accidental. Should not the fat cats from the Civic Platform (his political background) move and do something? Although I understand that the President in Poland is supposed to be impartial and not represent a single party, B. Komorowski’s party failed to act properly during the presidential campaign. For example, the national Civic Platform election committee closed down at 6:30 PM during the last three day before the elections. I have to say that with this level of involvement from his fellow party I am astonished he got 48.5% of votes” (*Tomasz Lis*, May 25, 2015).

Tomasz Lis on 4 May 2015, evaluated the presidential campaign of Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance, hereafter SLD):

“The campaign seemed like a trademark seppuku. (...) and you came to the conclusion it should be an unknown politician who distances herself from you at every step, dresses herself in a petticoat during evening meetings, and shows at each occasion that she does not give a damn about your party. I am sorry but it looks like it.”

Similar statements can be found in programs which hosted only journalists. However, their accumulation was even greater, which can be associated with the specificity of the format. Both the hosts and guests used populist rhetoric. Interestingly, potentially inflammatory statements concerned not only the discussed political events and behaviors of political actors, but also the journalists perceived as supporting the opposite side. One of the rhetorical means was to ascribe populism to the media from the other camp.

One interesting example of excluding populism was a statement by the host of *Salon dziennikarski* (October 8, 2016). Initiating a discussion on the ‘black protest’ against the proposed restrictive abortion law, supported by part of the ruling coalition and the Catholic Church, J. Karnowski argued that:

“according to official data, almost 98 thousand people protested in 100 cities all over Poland. Is it a lot or not? What does this protest tell us? Certainly we need to emphasize that the core of the protest was indecently vulgar, the organizers were extremely radical, and many of those women who joined the protest were not exactly aware of what was happening.”

Defining Populism

In discussions on current political events (regardless of the number of participants and the form of interaction – interview, commentary), the participants had a good chance to define populism. Based on the previous studies on populism, we assumed that the potential definitions could be categorized as follows: a threat to democracy, reinforcement of democracy, expression of anger, style of communication, or electoral strategy (see: Mudde, 2004; Bang and Marsh, 2018; Liddiard, 2019; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt, 2016; Aslanidis, 2018; de Vreese et al., 2018). Interestingly, we found no attempt at defining populism, and the journalists treated this term as self-evident, not requiring any additional explanation. However, statements which included the words populist/populism indicated they were associated mainly with the style of communication, and less frequently as an expression of anger. The remaining categories did not appear at all. At least in the case of the lack of implicit definition of populism as an electoral strategy is understandable, as the elections *per se* were not the subject matter of the analyzed debates.

The Causes of Populists' Popularity According to the Journalists. Examples of Populist Communication and Actions

Referring to populism as a phenomenon of political practice and discourse in contemporary democracies, none of the journalists in the analyzed programs attempted to explain the popularity of populists and their agenda. Interestingly, they also did not indicate any specific populist politician or political group. In the analyzed material, such a clear indication occurred only once, with an invited politician: Borys Budka, the Minister of Justice in the government of Platforma Obywatelska and Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People's Party, hereafter PSL) (*Kropka nad I*, March 30, 2016). However, given the strong politicization of journalism in Poland and the contexts of statements in the analyzed programs, it is clearly visible that the words populist/populism have highly negative connotations and always concern the opposite political side. The words were less frequently used in the programs broadcast by state-owned TVP, strictly controlled by the ruling right-wing coalition since 2015.

The Media as Populist Actors

In the typology of relations between the media and populism (Esser et al., 2017), three models are indicated: populism by the media, populism through the media, and populist civic journalism. However, journalists' statements in the studied TV programs cannot be directly qualified to any of these categories. Strong polarization of journalists dealing with political issues makes them active participants of populist political communication, which is manifested mainly in the interpretative (participatory) model of journalism (Patterson and Donsbach, 2004; Hanitzsch, 2007; Mellado, 2015). Of course, this was also associated with the nature of the studied TV programs, since the

aim of the discussions conducted in television studios was to interpret and explain current policies. Journalists, however, did not point to any specific media as populist, but through the visible parallelism of their views with specific political actors, one can see that they tended to assign populism to those media that favored their political antagonists.

Conclusions

The aim of our study was to determine whether journalists, acting as hosts or guests in TV political discussion programs used a populist style or they themselves could be defined as populist actors. Our research was diagnostic in nature, based on a qualitative analysis of political discourse. The diagnosis based on the obtained results will have, in our opinion, significance for showing the research potential of TV public affairs programs in research on populist political communication.

We obtained no clear answers to any of the six research questions. Journalists in their statements did use expressions characteristic for the populist style and also initiated populist discourse, but did not define populism, did not explain the reasons for its growing popularity, and did not indicate any specific political or media actors as populist.

Given the fact that the analyzed TV programs took place at roughly the same time, we may assume that the obtained results were associated with the issues that dominated the political debate at that time. The dominance of certain topics could have resulted in the formation of a populist attitude among the journalists. In addition, the selection of guests, especially in journalistic panels, was relatively stable, and resulted in a repetition of communication patterns, views and styles of expression.

If we assume that the populist discourse is characterized by “highly emotional, slogan-based, tabloid style language” (Mazzoleni, 2003, p. 5), linguistic radicalism, exaggeration, conflict and personalization, characteristic for tabloid journalism⁵ (Piontek et al., 2013), then that was the discourse that to some extent was present in all the analyzed materials. The populism expressed by the journalists was mainly present in the critique of politicians and other political actors, with visible partisanship and a certain snarkiness, which may testify to the low respect for the entire political class. Journalists did not refer to the people, and did not speak in the peoples’ name, and in one case (cited in our texts) a large group of citizens was discredited as susceptible to manipulation and views outside the mainstream of politics. In *Salon dziennikarski*, journalists indicated some political actors as more responsive to the opinion of the people, but – interestingly – they did not describe them as populist, probably due to their political sympathies.

Our in-depth analysis of journalistic statements resulted in yet another question, which may become an inspiration for future projects based on a larger database. In particular, it should be considered whether the institutional affiliation of journalists influences their inclination to use a populist discourse, whether there is a link between

⁵ This term refers to the journalistic standards that characterize modern quality information media that are becoming tabloidized (see Piontek et al., 2013).

specific events/topics in current politics that stimulates journalistic populist behaviors, or whether there are specific themes/events that encourage journalists to initiate a populist discourse.

Political opinion journalism appears here as a particularly important area of research, as journalists speak personally in these formats, without the visible interference of institutional factors, and the interaction taking place 'live' may provoke them to act spontaneously and express their real views. In addition, although the audience of TV political programs is smaller than that of TV news, they are also significant for the following reasons.

Firstly, the type and motivation of the audience is likely to be more interested in politics than regular TV viewers. They can be expected to seek in-depth information, and confront their own opinions with those presented by the journalists. These viewers are likely to play the role of opinion leaders in their communities, thereby increasing the real reach of political journalism. Secondly, by selecting topics, and discussing and interpreting political events, journalists not only influence the views of their audience but also actively participate in the political debate, which makes them significant political actors that those in power need to reckon with. We do not mean here the traditional interdependence of politics and the media, where journalists used to avoid open support of specific politicians/political parties. In a situation of acute political conflict, with little room for discussion and compromise, journalists may be treated as desirable allies, a kind of avant-garde influence, in times of low confidence in politicians. Hence the importance of research designed to determine whether they actually become one.

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ANNEX

Table 6.1. The list of TV programs with the date of broadcast and the list of participants

TITLE	TYPE	DATE	GUESTS
1	2	3	4
<i>Tomasz Lis na żywo</i>	interview	20.04.2015	Michał Fiszer (e), Wiesław Jedynek (e), Barbara Nowacka (RP), Maciej Komorowski (e), Marek Bukowski (a)
		27.04.2015	Aleksander Smolar (ngo), Andrzej Celiński (SLD), Konstanty Gebert (GW), Jan Grabowski (h), Piotr Gontarczyk (h)
		4.05.2015	Joanna Senyszyn (SLD), Jacek Protasiewicz (PO), Zbigniew Ziobro (SP), Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz (PSL), Agnieszka Holland (f)
		11.05.2015	Aleksander Kwaśniewski (b. prezydent RP), Aleksander Smolar (ngo), Radosław Markowski (ps)
		18.05.2015	Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (b. premier), Janusz Lewandowski (PO), Tomasz Karolak (a)

1	2	3	4
		25.05.2015	Joanna Mucha (PO), Ryszard Petru (N), Ryszard Kalisz (DWP), Aleksander Smolar (ngo), Radosław Markowski (ps), Anna Materka-Sosnowska (ps)
		1.06.2015	Roman Giertych (b. polityk LPR), Wojciech Olejniczak (SLD), Karolina Figura (KL), Wojciech Sadurski (p), Ireneusz Krzemiński (s)
Kropka nad i	interview	2.04.2015	Joachim Brudziński (PiS)
		14.04.2015	Stefan Niesiołowski (PO), Zbigniew Ziobro (SP)
		5.05.2015	Marzena Wróbel (niezrzeszona, d. PiS), Stefan Niesiołowski (PO)
		18.05.2015	Jacek Kurski (przedstawiony jako coach Andrzeja Dudy, PiS), Michał Kamiński (przedstawiony jako coach Bronisława Komorowskiego, PO)*
		26.05.2015	Marek Belka (prezes NBP)
		3.02.2016	Leszek Balcerowicz (b. polityk PO)
		8.02.2016	Waldemar Żurek (rzecznik KRS)
		15.02.2016	Cezary Tomczyk (PO), Jacek Sasin (PiS)
		30.03.2016	B. Budka (PO), Patryk Jaki (SP)
		4.04.2016	Józef Kloch (EP)
		20.04.2016	Beata Kempa (SP)
		12.09.2016	Ryszard Patru (N)
		20.09.2016	Jerzy Miller (PO), Paweł Deresz (e)
		27.09.2016	Andrzej Dera (PiS)
		3.10.2016	Romuald Dębski (e), Magdalena Cielecka (a)
		11.10.2016	Roman Giertych (b. polityk LPR)
		24.10.2016	Małgorzata Kidawa-Błońska (PO), Jacek Żalek (PR)
		7.11.2016	Borys Budka (PO), Grzegorz Długi (K'15)
		9.11.2016	Aleksander Kwaśniewski (b. prezydent RP)
		17.11.2016	Roman Giertych (b. polityk LPR)
		24.11.2016	Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (b. premier)
		2.02.2017	Andrzej Zoll (b. prezes TK)
		8.02.2017	Ryszard Czarnecki (PiS), Rafał Trzaskowski (PO)
		20.02.2017	Agnieszka Holland (r)
		28.02.2017	Mirosław Róžański (e)
		21.03.2017	Andrzej Zoll (b. prezes TK), Waldemar Żurek (rzecznik KRS)
		3.04.2017	Rafał Trzaskowski (PO)
10.04.2017	Maciej Lasek (e)		
19.04.2017	Cezary Tomczyk (PO), Jan Maria Jackowski (PiS)		
3.06.2017	Adam Bielan (SP)		
Salon dziennikarski	journalistic comments	3.09.2016	Magdalena Ogórek (TVP), Henryk Zieliński (I), Piotr Zaremba (WS), Piotr Semka (DR)
		10.09.2016	Henryk Zieliński (I), Jacek Łęski (TVP), Piotr Zaremba (WS), Stanisław Janicki (wP)
		17.09.2016	Marek Markiewicz (p), Henryk Zieliński (I), Piotr Zaremba (WS), Anita Gargas (TVP)
		24.09.2016	Agnieszka Romaszewska (Tv Bielsat), Henryk Zieliński (I), Piotr Semka (DR), Piotr Zaremba (WS)
		1.10.2016	Stanisław Janicki (wP), Henryk Zieliński (I), Jan Pospieszalski (TVP), Piotr Zaremba (WS)
		8.10.2016	Dorota Łosiewicz (wP), Henryk Zieliński (I), Piotr Zaremba (WS), Piotr Gursztyn (TVP)
		22.10.2016	Marzena Nykiel (wP), Marek Markiewicz (p), Agnieszka Romanowska (TV Bielsat), Piotr Zaremba (WS)
		5.11.2016	Anita Gargas (TVP), Henryk Zieliński (I), Piotr Zaremba (WS), Piotr Semka (DR)
		19.11.2016	Witold Gadowski (WS), Henryk Zieliński (I), Piotr Skwieciński (WS), Stanisław Janecki (TVP)

1	2	3	4
		26.11.2016	Konrad Kołodziejcki (R), Henryk Zieliński (I), Piotr Zaremba (WS), Krzysztof Skowroński (radio Wnet)
		4.02.2017	Dorota Łosiewicz (wP), Henryk Zieliński (I), Marek Markiewicz (p), Piotr Zaremba (WS)
		11.02.2017	Adrian Stankowski (GPC), Henryk Zieliński (I), Piotr Skwieciński (WS), Stanisław Janicki (wP)
		18.02.2017	Piotr Semka (DR), Henryk Zieliński (I), Jan Pospieszalski (TVP), Piotr Zaremba (WS)
		25.02.2017	Maciej Pawlicki (WS), Henryk Zieliński (I), Ewa Stankiewicz (f), Piotr Zaremba (WS)
		4.03.2017	Radbad Klijnstra (a), Henryk Zieliński (I), Piotr Zaremba (WS), Piotr Semka (WS)
		18.03.2017	Stanisław Janicki (wP), Henryk Zieliński (I), Piotr Semka (DR), Piotr Zaremba (WS)
		25.03.2017	Anita Gargas (TVP), Konrad Kołodziejcki (wP), Marek Markiewicz (p), Piotr Semka (WS)
		1.04.2017	Agnieszka Romaszewska (TV Bieslan), Piotr Zaremba (WS), Maciej Pawlicki (f), Henryk Zieliński (I)
		8.04.2017	Piotr Semka (DR), Piotr Zaremba (WS), Henryk Zieliński (I), Anita Gargas (TVP)
		15.04.2017	Tadeusz Zysk (w), Bronisław Wildstein (TVP), Piotr Zaremba (WS)
		22.04.2017	Dorota Łosiewicz (wP), Maciej Pawlicki (WS), Henryk Zieliński (I), Marek Markiewicz (p)
		29.04.2017	Piotr Zaremba (WS), Maciej Pawlicki (f), Piotr Skwieciński (WS), Piotr Semka (DR)
Łoża dziennikarska	Journalistic comments	7.06.2015	Seweryn Blumsztajn (GW), Jacek Czarnecki (Radio Zet), Dominik Zdort (R), Piotr Skwieciński (WS)
		6.03.2016	Renata Grochal (GW), Daniel Passent (P), Andrzej Stankiewicz (R), Paweł Lisicki (DR)
		20.03.2016	Adam Szostkiewicz (P), Dominika Wielowieyska (GW), Andrzej Stankiewicz (R), Paweł Lisicki (DR)
		10.04.2016	Jacek Zakowski (P), Renata Grochal (GW), Tomasz Skory (RMF FM), Kamila Baranowska (DR)
		11.09.2016	Sławomir Sierakowski (KP), Wojciech Maziarski (GW), Andrzej Stankiewicz (Onet.pl), Agnieszka Romaszewska (Bielsat TV)
		23.10.2016	Mariusz Janicki (P), Seweryn Blumsztajn (GW), Tomasz Skory (RMF FM), Agaton Koziański (PT)
		30.10.2016	Renata Grochal (GW), Daniel Passent (P), Paweł Lisicki (DR), Agnieszka Romaszewska (Bielsat TV)
		13.11.2016	Cezary Michalski (NW), Piotr Stasiński (GW), Andrzej Stankiewicz (Onet.pl), Paweł Lisicki (DR)
		20.11.2016	Wojciech Maziarski (GW), Daniel Passent (P), Tomasz Skory (RMF FM), Michał Szuldrzyński (R)
		27.11.2016	Sławomir Sierakowski (KP), Cezary Łazarewicz (no), Jacek Czarnecki (Radio Zet), Filip Memches (R)
		5.02.2017	Tomasz Walek (no), Ewa Siedlecka (GW), Michał Szuldrzyński (R), Paweł Lisicki (DR)
		19.02.2017	Sławomir Sierakowski (KP), Seweryn Blumsztajn (GW), Tomasz Skory (RMF FM), Paweł Lisicki (DR)
		12.03.2017	Mariusz Janicki (P), Maciej Stasiński (GW), Jędrzej Bielecki (R), Paweł Lisicki (DR)
		26.03.2017	Mariusz Janicki (P), Piotr Stasiński (GW), Tomasz Skory (RMF FM), Michał Szuldrzyński (R)

* Television broadcast before the second round of the presidential election.

Source: Own elaboration.

LEGEND**POLITICAL PARTIES:**

PiS – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)
PO – Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform)
SP – Solidarna Polska (Solidary Poland)
SLD – Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance)
PSL – Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People's Party)
LPR – Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families)
N – Nowoczesna.pl (Modern.pl)
DWP – Dom Wszystkich Polska (Poland – Home to All)
RP – Ruch Palikota (Palikot's Movement)
K'15 – Kukiz'15 (Kukiz-15)
PR – Polska Razem (Poland Together)

MEDIA:

GW – *Gazeta Wyborcza*
P – *Polityka*
R – *Rzeczpospolita*
NW – *Newsweek*
DR – *Do Rzeczy*
WS – *W Sieci*
KP – *Krytyka Polityczna*
PT – *Polska the Times*
I – *Idziemy*
wP – *wPolityce*
GPC – *Gazeta Polska Codziennie*

OTHERS:

NBP – Narodowy Bank Polski (National Bank of Poland)
EP – Episkopat Polski (Polish Episcopate)
TK – Trybunał Konstytucyjny (Constitutional Tribunal)
KRS – Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (National Council of the Judiciary)
ngo – non-governmental organization
h – historian
f – film-maker
p – lawyer
s – sociologist
ps – political scientist,
e – expert
a – actor
w – publisher
no – no affiliation